BACKGROUND: The intensified Armenia–Russia bilateral reengagement commenced on October 8, 2024, with the Moscow meeting between Putin and Pashinyan, ostensibly ending a two-year estrangement stemming from Moscow’s inaction and the CSTO’s reluctance to deter or even explicitly identify Azerbaijan as the initiator of the September 2022 incursions into Armenian territory. Equally detrimental was the perception that Moscow had tacitly approved Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military operation in Karabakh.
The October 2024 meeting set both sides on a path toward a “new rhythm” in strategic relations, creating the basis for a renewed partnership aimed at resolving the “misunderstandings” that had emerged, as later described by Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan and Sergey Lavrov. The two leaders have since maintained regular contact through phone calls and in-person meetings throughout 2025. Yerevan also hosted several high-level Russian delegations, underscoring the breadth and institutional depth of the renewed dialogue.
In January and May 2025, the foreign ministers made reciprocal visits, each reaffirming the start of a “new page” in the strategic partnership through “genuine and open discussions on accumulated issues.” This diplomatic thaw reached its peak in June 2025 with the visit of Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of Russia’s Federation Council, to Yerevan, aimed at strengthening parliamentary cooperation.
Her meetings were widely seen as a sign of Moscow’s friendly neutrality ahead of Armenia’s 2026 elections. After her meeting with Pashinyan on June 6, Matviyenko stated that “[Pashinyan] conveyed greetings to our president and emphasized that, despite insinuations, he and [Putin] have always maintained constructive, substantive relations without any issues,” sending a clear message to the “ill-wishers.”
Pashinyan also attended several international forums led or co-funded by Russia: the Victory Day parade in Moscow, the BRICS Summit in Kazan, the International Conference on Nature and Environmental Protection in the Altai, and the SCO summit.
The strengthening of Armenia–Russia relations is closely linked to economic interdependence and the gradual improvement of Russia’s public image in Armenia. Trade turnover reached a record USD 12.4 billion in 2024, more than twice the 2022 level.
Armenia’s re-export channels have supported transfers of dual-use goods and embargoed gold to Russia, while Azerbaijan has discreetly facilitated the re-export of Russian hydrocarbons.
In September 2025, during World Atomic Week in Moscow, Pashinyan and Putin agreed that Rosatom would extend the operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant for another decade.
A July 2025 poll showed improvement in Armenian public attitudes toward Russia: only 27% saw Russia as the “greatest threat,” down from 40% a year earlier, while 45% now viewed Russia as Armenia’s most important political partner.
IMPLICATIONS: The ongoing renegotiation of the Russia–Armenia alliance, along with Putin’s rapprochement with Azerbaijan, suggests that recurring crises in Moscow’s relations with Yerevan and Baku are not genuine strategic breaks but tactical frictions used for political goals.
Western narratives often overstate shifts such as Armenia’s “pro-Western pivot” or Azerbaijan’s “anti-Russian turn.” In reality, both countries balance between Moscow and the West to gain leverage.
For Armenia, this means showing European ambitions while keeping practical ties with Russia. For example, the 2024 removal of Russian border guards from the Armenia–Iran border was largely symbolic.
Azerbaijan also dramatizes disagreements with Russia while maintaining deep cooperation in energy, transport, and security.
For Moscow, this ambiguity is beneficial—it maintains influence while appearing less intrusive. Even Western-backed projects like the TRIPP corridor are seen as fitting into Russia’s broader connectivity strategy.
