New electoral thresholds and their impact on upcoming parliamentary elections

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Armenia is heading to parliamentary elections on June 7. Several new electoral rules, adopted earlier but designed to take effect at the next regular elections, are now in force for the first time. In this article, we will focus on the changes in electoral thresholds, one of the most important elements of the electoral system.

The Importance of Electoral Thresholds

An electoral threshold is the minimum percentage of votes that a party or coalition should collect to win seats in the National Assembly. In proportional electoral systems, which are designed to promote multiparty development, the use of electoral thresholds is a common practice.

The main purpose of electoral thresholds is to ensure a balance between effective governance and representation in parliament. On the one hand, they contribute to the formation of a stable majority in the legislative body, and on the other hand, they ensure fair representation of political diversity.

The main argument in favor of electoral thresholds is that they reduce the fragmentation of the party system, that is, the fragmentation of parties into smaller units. Typically, countries with high electoral thresholds have fewer influential parties in the political arena than countries with no threshold or very low thresholds. This is often seen as a positive phenomenon, since the presence of a large number of influential parties can make it more difficult to form a government.

In addition, there is a concern that in the absence of an electoral threshold, extremist parties could receive several mandates and use their parliamentary presence to gain greater popularity.

These concerns were particularly acute in Germany in the 1950s. Memories of the instability of the Weimar Republic were still fresh, and the fact that 10 parties with at least five seats in the first post-war elections was a worrying development. The introduction of the 5% electoral threshold in 1957 is often seen as the basis for Germany’s emergence as a model of a moderate multi-party system.

The Venice Commission emphasizes that the choice of the electoral system elements is a sovereign right of each state, but it should be determined through broad and open discussions. However, the Commission often advises states to lower electoral thresholds that are above 5%, as they can lead to a high number of wasted votes and undermine proportional representation.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), in its 1547 and 1791 resolutions, recommends that the electoral threshold for parliamentary elections in established democracies should not exceed 3%, as depriving groups of people of their right to representation is detrimental to the democratic system.

Additionally, high thresholds can have a negative impact on parties representing national minorities or parties representing certain territories and newly formed political forces. Therefore, electoral systems should ensure appropriate inclusive mechanisms.

Critics of electoral thresholds often indicate that they artificially undermine the representativeness of parliament. It is also noted that thresholds weaken pluralism, which is an important pillar of democracy. They force small parties to artificially unite to overcome the threshold, and ultimately effectively deprive citizens who voted for small parties of the right to representation.

However, as the Venice Commission notes, no electoral system is fully proportional in practice, as a large number of voters must transform into a smaller body of elected representatives. The challenge for the states is to find the right balance.

Changes in Electoral Thresholds in the Republic of Armenia

In all parliamentary elections held in the Republic of Armenia from 1995 to 2021, a 5% threshold for parties has been in force. Since 2007, an additional 7% threshold has been introduced for party alliances. Now, Article 95, paragraph 4 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia establishes new thresholds: 4% for parties, 8% for alliances of up to three parties, and 10% for alliances of four or more parties.

This amendment to the Code was adopted on May 7, 2021. However, it did not come into effect in the subsequent snap parliamentary elections held in June 2021. This is because the new legislation envisaged the latest thresholds coming into effect only in the next regular elections, which are now planned for June of this year.

The section on justifications included in the draft package of legislative amendments of 2021 effectively offers no justification on the reasons behind the latest changes in thresholds. The justification mentioned during the verbal discussions was as follows: alliances in the Republic of Armenia are not created around the axis of ideological agreement but are abused by parties as a tool for political rebranding, blurring the political responsibility of the past, trying to hide the real actors, their trajectory and funders under the name of new alliances. Therefore, the first reason for the change is to combat this phenomenon.

Another verbal justification presented later was reducing the large number of parties and consolidating them. It is expected that the high thresholds set for alliances will force ideologically close parties to unite permanently and participate in elections as one party.

Like other important draft amendments to the Electoral Code, this draft was also submitted to the Venice Commission’s assessment. The Commission welcomed the lower 4% threshold for parties, stressing that this change is a step towards a more pluralistic parliament.

At the same time, the Commission noted that, despite the 2016 joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR, the new Armenian draft law lifts the threshold for electoral alliances. Moreover, in the case of an alliance between two parties, the threshold was raised to a high passing limit of 8%, in the case of an alliance between three parties to 9%, and in the case of an alliance between four parties to 10%. The 9% requirement was not included in the final version.

According to the Commission, such differentiation of thresholds is rare and although not contrary to European standards, it complicates the system of allocation of mandates. The Commission emphasizes that no justification is given for the change. Furthermore, it notes that lowering the threshold for parties does not explain lifting the threshold for alliances. While the state has a wide margin of discretion in balancing fair representation with government stability, the thresholds must be justified by specific political and institutional circumstances.

In the 2016 joint opinion issued to the Republic of Armenia, the Commission notes that it is not clear why a higher threshold should be set for alliances, since alliances can contribute to broader cooperation and the formation of a more stable government. Therefore, the electoral threshold for alliances could be the same as the one for parties. Setting higher thresholds for alliances could significantly limit the opportunities for small parties to enter parliament.

The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR emphasize that proportional systems are designed to create a representative parliament, and any changes to that objective should be made with caution and based on clear necessity.

To summarize, the joint advisory opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR on the draft legislative amendments of 2021 concludes:

The amendments regarding the thresholds are not balanced, as some of them are lowered and others are raised without clear justification. The Venice Commission recommends reviewing the provisions regarding the thresholds, aiming to maintain a balance between the necessary stability of the parliamentary majority and the pluralism inherent in proportional systems.

Despite that, the draft was adopted by the National Assembly, maintaining the high thresholds set for alliances.

Comparative Analysis

It is widely believed that proportional electoral systems contribute to the formation of a multi-party system. Hence, one might think that with the transition to a fully proportional electoral system, more parties in the Republic of Armenia should have had the opportunity to be represented in the parliament. However, studying the electoral history of the Republic of Armenia, we see the opposite picture. From election to election, the parliament, instead of becoming more representative, becomes more elitist.

This situation is problematic, as the representation of few forces in parliament with the dominance of one impoverishes political agendas, reduces public representation and interest. Moreover, these regulations deepen political polarization, keeping extreme positions dominant and in demand in the political palette.

National Assembly Elections: Historical Overview

  • 1995: mixed electoral system; 13 participants; 5 forces entered parliament; threshold 5%.
  • 1999: mixed electoral system; 21 participants; 6 forces entered parliament; threshold 5%.
  • 2003: mixed electoral system; 21 participants; 6 forces entered parliament; threshold 5%.
  • 2007: mixed electoral system; 23 participants; 5 forces entered parliament; threshold 5% for parties and 7% for alliances.
  • 2012: mixed electoral system; 9 participants; 6 forces entered parliament; threshold 5% for parties and 7% for alliances.
  • 2017: proportional electoral system; 9 participants; 4 forces entered parliament; threshold 5% for parties and 7% for alliances.
  • 2018: proportional electoral system; 11 participants; 3 forces entered parliament; threshold 5% for parties and 7% for alliances.
  • 2021: proportional electoral system; 25 participants; 3 forces entered parliament; threshold 5% for parties and 7% for alliances.
  • 2026: proportional electoral system; threshold 4% for parties, 8% for alliances of up to three parties, and 10% for alliances of four or more parties.

It is worth emphasizing that one of the three forces that appeared in parliament in the last 2021 National Assembly elections, the Pativ Unem alliance, also known as I Have Honor, received mandates solely on the provisions of the electoral law, without overcoming the 7% threshold applicable to alliances. In fact, only two of the 25 participating forces exceeded the electoral threshold: one party and one alliance.

Regional comparisons are also interesting. Depending on the historical and social context, political and legal traditions, or the strength of democracy, the level of electoral thresholds may have different purposes or effects in each country. Electoral thresholds in Europe range from 0.67% in the Netherlands to 11% in the Czech Republic for alliances with three or more parties, but the most commonly used thresholds are 3-5%.

Election Thresholds for Political Parties in Peer Group Countries

  • Georgia: 5%.
  • Slovakia: 5%.
  • Lithuania: 5%.
  • Moldova: 5%.
  • Latvia: 5%.
  • Estonia: 5%.
  • Croatia: 5%.
  • Armenia: 4%.
  • Slovenia: 4%.
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina: 3%.
  • Albania: 1%.

Election Thresholds for Alliances in Peer Group Countries

  • Armenia: 10% for alliances including four or more parties.
  • Slovakia: 10%.
  • Armenia: 8% for alliances including up to three parties.
  • Slovakia: 7%.
  • Lithuania: 7%.
  • Moldova: 7%.
  • Georgia: 5%.
  • Latvia: 5%.
  • Estonia: 5%.
  • Croatia: 5%.
  • Slovenia: 4%.
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina: 3%.
  • Albania: 1%.

Compared to the countries that have a proportional electoral system and relative similarity in their size and population numbers, Armenia has an average electoral threshold for parties, but the highest recorded thresholds for alliances.

Particular attention should be paid to an unprecedentedly high 10% electoral threshold for alliances of four or more parties. It is worth recalling the case of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey (2008) before the European Court of Human Rights concerning the 10% electoral threshold in Turkey, which was one of the highest in Europe. The European Court of Human Rights did not mandate to lower the threshold, recognizing the wide margin of states’ authority in the design of electoral systems, but emphasized that such a high threshold could negatively affect political pluralism and representation. This case has since been widely discussed in electoral law professional circles and is often cited as a problematic example of high electoral thresholds.

Threshold or Barrier?

Conclusion

What are the possible effects of the new thresholds set for alliances?

  • Proportional electoral systems with high thresholds can lead to disproportionate results, generating a high percentage of votes that end up not represented in parliament. In the 2021 National Assembly elections, 20% of votes, every fifth vote, fell into this category. The higher thresholds now set for alliances could in principle increase this risk further, though much will depend on how many alliances participate and their electoral strength.
  • Meanwhile, deepening political polarization and antagonism require political parties to initiate broader collaboration. Recent public opinion surveys show that 52% of the adult population of Armenia does not trust any political force. Therefore, it may be a great challenge for any single political force alone to mobilize this mass of disappointed or indifferent voters. However, raising the thresholds for alliances creates a major obstacle for parties to enter dialogue, cooperate, and present a joint electoral list, instead encouraging them to either compete separately or merge permanently.
  • Trying to adapt to the new rules of the game and overcome high thresholds, parties wishing to form alliances can take advantage of a provision of the Electoral Code that allows each party to include up to 30% of candidates who are not members of the given party in its electoral list. Such informal alliances, however, also carry significant risks. If candidates from another party, especially the ones who are in the leading position, are included in the party’s electoral list and get into the parliament, which party bears political responsibility for their decisions? Financial control of such alliances also becomes significantly more difficult.
  • In a country like Armenia with parties built around personal loyalty rather than ideology, parties with accumulated financial resources or administrative resources have advantage over new or resource-poor political forces. Raising thresholds for alliances also risks reinforcing this structural inequality.

Formation of alliances is also discouraged by several other provisions of the Electoral Code:

  • The existing mechanism of state funding to parties. Parties can receive funding from the state budget even if they have not overcome the threshold but have received at least 2% of votes. Meanwhile, alliances must overcome thresholds of 8% or 10% to qualify for state funding.
  • The third force rule. The law guarantees representation for at least three political forces in parliament: if only two cross their respective thresholds, the next closest force to its own threshold enters parliament regardless. This means that, under certain configurations, a party with 3.5% of the vote will gain seats over an alliance that fell short of its threshold but received 6.5%.

Noting that some political alliances in Armenia have lacked a solid ideological basis, have posed challenges for ensuring financial transparency, and have generally been short-lived in recent years, restricting their formation through high thresholds nonetheless requires clear and well-substantiated justification. These issues, after all, are not unique to alliances but are also widely present among individual political parties. Is raising thresholds the appropriate solution, turning them into a barrier to the formation of alliances?

In summary, the reduction of thresholds for parties in Armenia by one percentage point is undoubtedly a positive change. At the same time, the new thresholds set for alliances are too high and risk inhibiting political cooperation and diverse representation in the National Assembly.

Sources and Notes

  • 1. The Venice Commission is an independent advisory body of the Council of Europe, specializing in constitutional law, electoral systems, and the development of democratic institutions.
  • 2. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2018)004-e
  • 3. https://www.arlis.am/hy/acts/105967/latest
  • 4. http://www.parliament.am/draft_docs7/KH-894_himnavorum.pdf
  • 5. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-PI(2021)006-arm
  • 6. Armenia: Joint Opinion on the Draft Electoral Code of 18 April 2016, CDL-AD(2016)019, paragraph 39.
  • 7. Armenia: Joint Opinion on the Draft Electoral Code of 18 April 2016, CDL-AD(2016)019, paragraph 26.
  • 8. https://council.am/entry/8372/hayastanum-yntrakan-hamakargi-zargacumy-yev-azdecutyuny-xorhrdaranakan-kusakcutyunnneri-hamakargi-vra/#_ednref2
  • 9. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=129Cdatabase_theme=307
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